Deployment has ostensibly begun, but not all sites are prepared for these installations. The Tu-22M3 uses as many as 10 Raduga Kh-15 missiles or up to three Raduga Kh-22 missiles, which are designed to defeat advanced air defense systems and may carry nuclear warheads. Soon afterward, Moscow announced the deployment of Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, Tupolev Tu-142 and Ilyushin Il-38 maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft. In the Black Sea Region, Russia deployed a shore-based Bastion-P anti-ship missile system on the Crimean peninsula, equipped with P-800 Oniks missiles and S-300 PMU anti-aircraft missile systems, all connected to coastal radars. Should NATO wish to build up its capacity to more quickly overcome this A2/AD bubble, the Alliance would require additional forward deployments of forces and equipment. They argue this decision is in response to the U.S.-supplied NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability under development in Romania and Poland. Further defended with Pantsir-S gun-missiles, Kaliningrad’s offensive weapons effectively render large amounts of the Lithuanian and Polish airspace de facto no-fly zones for conventional non-stealthy aircraft.Īlthough Russia has, in two previous occasions, temporarily placed the 500km-range, nuclear-capable Iskander missile in Kaliningrad, officials now say the missile will be deployed there permanently by 2019. Additionally, Kaliningrad hosts the S-400 Triumf and the SA-21 Growler, which has an operational range of 400km. As for A2/AD capabilities, the exclave hosts coastal radars that can connect to K-300P Bastion-P shore-based mobile anti-ship missile batteries, which launch Mach 2.5+ supersonic sea-skimming P-800 Oniks missiles. While relatively vulnerable itself, Kaliningrad is heavily militarized. In turn, this would prevent Russia from closing off the Baltic countries from the rest of the Alliance-a crucial reason for NATO to further its partnership with Sweden. If anti-access capabilities were deployed on the island, they would severely constraint Moscow’s ability to impose an area denial bubble over the region. The missing piece in Russia A2/AD bubble in the Baltic region is the Swedish island of Gotland. Because NATO lacks significant pre-positioned stocks and forward deployed forces east of Germany, the Russian build-up of A2/AD capabilities in its Western Military District, Kaliningrad, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea presents a challenge to reinforcing the Baltic States quickly enough to prevent a rapid Russian victory. The Suwalki gap, located along the Polish-Lithuanian border, is vulnerable to Russian shelling or invasion from Kaliningrad and Belarus in the event of a conflict-making overland reinforcement difficult. NATO’s small footprint in the region and the geographic isolation of the Baltic States accentuate this threat. The Baltic region is where Russia poses the greatest challenge to NATO, particularly to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland. Russia’s A2/AD exclusion zones can be geographically broken down as such: The Baltics In the Warsaw communiqué, NATO expressed its concerns over these developments, declaring that it would not accept having the freedom of movement of Allied forces constrained by any potential adversary. These A2/AD bubbles allow Moscow to deny the use of the airspace in these areas and dramatically constraint the movement of ships and land forces in case of a crisis. In response to NATO’s unmatched ability to conduct large-scale airspace operations, Russia has established large anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) exclusion zones or “bubbles” around the Baltic states, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arctic. The information and views set out in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
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